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Appeals from Claim Rejections
By Hugh C. Bickford

The suggestion has been made that the jurisdiction of the board
of tax appeals be enlarged to enable it to pass upon suits for the
recovery of taxes, in addition to its present power to review de
terminations of deficiencies as made by the commissioner of
internal revenue. The thought has a parental wish. Obviously,
the wish is that there be some judicial body with authority to
review decisions of the commissioner in cases where his view is
considered erroneous and it is found, due to the particular status
of the case, that the board does not have jurisdiction.
The suggestion should be carefully weighed. When one finds
a tribunal with over twenty thousand unheard cases on its docket
and learns, as a result, that his case, when filed, must wait for
several years before it is tried, and even longer before it is decided,
one must express some doubt as to the wisdom of increasing the
business of that tribunal and further submerging its functions
beneath the flood of a new class of cases. The fact remains,
however, that this board can not review many decisions of the
commissioner, such as rejections of claims for refund, and that
these decisions are as likely to require review and correction as
those which result in deficiencies and may, therefore, be carried
to the board. The fact which is too generally ignored is that
there is ample opportunity of reviewing the commissioner’s
actions on refund claims without going to the board. The writer
refers to review by the federal courts. This right existed before
the board was established and if it had been resorted to more fre
quently probably would have made unnecessary the creation of
the board in the first instance.
Before the creation of the board there was not one case in many
thousands which reached the courts. Yet, at that time, the com
missioner was handing down the same decisions which are being
made today, with the same, if not a greater degree of inaccuracy
than that which now prompts the filing of so many petitions with
the board. True, there was no mode of obtaining relief until after
the tax was paid but even this relief was not often sought because
of the generally prevailing hesitancy to go into court.
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The effect of the creation of the board upon tax practice has
been marked in many respects, but in none so plainly as in the
effect upon those who represent taxpayers. They now unhesi
tatingly turn to the board for the courtlike relief which it affords,
and, in so doing, they have learned the magic of sworn testimony
and documentary proof, properly presented, and of logical
argument, timely made. They have learned that public
decisions based upon a public record are rather less arbitrary
and infinitely more satisfactory in ultimate result. Strangely,
however, there is still the same hesitancy to seek the relief which
the courts afford and still the same ungrounded fear of suits for
recovery.
One sometimes wonders if the hesitancy was or is caused by
the fact that tax representatives, generally, are not trial lawyers,
and reach the conclusion that if the case is carried into the courts
it will mean that they will have to relinquish its control. The
thought is too repugnant to bear emphasis. Surely, no profes
sional man, whether he be an accountant or office lawyer, would
be guilty of restricting the rights of his clients to the limits of his
own capabilities.
The writer does not wish to enter the dog-eared discussion as
to which is best qualified to handle a tax case—the accountant
or the lawyer. He sometimes thinks that one must be both; and,
likewise, an economist, a statistician, a paragon of patience, yea,
even a psychologist, for else how could one know just the proper
time to admire the cravat of the conferee? Undoubtedly, how
ever, there is need at times for the British system of the divided
sphere of solicitor and advocate. When the solicitor has con
ducted, out of court, all negotiations and conferences seeking to
obtain for his client a just settlement, and has failed, it is his duty,
in a proper case, to recommend trial and to arrange for the ad
vocate, or barrister, to conduct the trial of the case. So, in tax
cases, when the accountant, or office lawyer, has exhausted all
proper means before the department and has failed to obtain
that which it is honestly believed his client is justly entitled to,
it is his duty to advise his client of his right to recover by court
action and to bring to that proceeding, in an advisory capacity,
the knowledge and experience which he has derived from the
negotiations before the department. Otherwise, the representa
tive has failed to apprise his client of his full remedy and has
subjugated the rights of the cause to his own limitations.
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For example, some months ago there was a case pending
before the treasury department involving the valuation of a
patent. The inventor had conducted the business of manufac
turing the patented article as a sole proprietorship for seven
years. His inventive genius was far superior to his business
sagacity and the company lost money in virtually every year.
Finally, a corporation (let us steal the department’s custom and
call it the M Company) was formed and the patent, together with
all other assets of the business, was paid in for capital stock.
Stock having a par value of two million dollars was issued for
the patent, and the M Company subsequently claimed as deduc
tions from gross income the amortization of that amount. The
department applied its well known formula, based solely upon
earnings, and held the patent to be worthless with the result that
the entire deduction was disallowed. Affidavits were obtained
from several nationally known experts in the art who testified
that in their opinion the patented article was the best of its kind
in the world—a distinct and highly valuable contribution to
commerce and to science. Hundreds of original letters were
exhibited which contained orders for the article which had not
been filled because of the limited facilities of the business as it had
been conducted. Finally, several business men of the community
executed affidavits that several months before the incorporation
of the business they had offered one million dollars for the patent
and had been turned down by the proprietor, and, further, that
they had agreed among themselves to pay two million if they could
get the patent. Spokesmen of the unit said they “didn’t know
these men; they didn’t know whether they had two million dollars;
they didn’t know whether they would have given it if they had
had it.” (Any tax representative knows the rest of their answer.)
Affidavits were filed by prominent bankers testifying that the
men making the offer were the wealthiest and best type of men in
the community (character witnesses). Finally, letters were filed
from members of congress from that locality testifying to the
honesty and reputation of the bankers and of the offering syndi
cate. The unit continued to point out that the patent had never
produced any actual profits, but finally yielded sufficiently to
allow a value of one million dollars. The case was carried into
court. There the same witnesses were called. Their testimony
was convincing and the government offered no rebuttal. It was
not necessary there to bring in a second group of witnesses to
186
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prove that the first witnesses were not liars and a third group to
prove that the second were honest. The two-million-dollar
valuation was allowed. A hesitancy to go into court in this case
would have cost the clients many thousands of dollars.
Still another illustration. A partnership claimed special assess
ment under section 210 of the revenue act of 1917. The partner
ship was a commission house and argued that it had done over
six million dollars’ worth of business for its clients on a capital of
only $16,000. It kept no books of the total business handled but
only of the net commissions received. By consistent rule of the
trade such commissions were paid at the rate of one and onequarter per cent. of the business handled and amounted to $75,000
for the taxable year. Capitalizing this amount, the figure of
$6,000,000 was easily obtained. The department refused to
believe that $75,000 in commissions meant a total business han
dled amounting to $6,000,000. One representative in the de
partment went so far as to intimate that inasmuch as that figure
was not on the books, somebody must be fabricating. Affidavits,
briefs, protests, photostats of the books and all other evidence
requested were filed with the department, but the claim was
rejected. The case was carried into court where the same evidence
was presented which had been exhibited to the department. The
government’s arbitrary opinion was not competent evidence.
The court specially found the facts without question. A hesi
tancy to go into the courts in this case would have cost the client
considerable in taxes which he did not legally owe. The illus
trations could be presented ad infinitum. The point is that there
should be no such indecision, in a proper case, to claim a right
which the law gives. The answer in such cases lies in the courts.
To place one in the proper position to advise court action and
to arrange for its commencement, it is necessary to know the
remedies provided. The principal class of cases will be those in
which the taxes have been paid and claims for refund rejected.
Before suit may be brought for the recovery of such taxes all of
the prerequisites established by law must have been observed.
It must be borne in mind that the sovereign may not be sued
without its consent, and, if it has attached purely formal conditions
to its consent to be sued, these conditions must be complied with.
As Mr. Justice Holmes has stated: “ Men must turn square corners
when they deal with the government.” The conditions to be
fulfilled before suit may be commenced are contained in section
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1113 of the revenue act of 1926, amending section 3226 of the
Revised Statutes. Briefly stated, they are:

1. The tax must have been paid.
2. Within the statutory period of limitations a proper claim for
refund must have been filed.
3. The claim for refund must have been rejected, or, if not re
jected, must have been pending before the commissioner for
at least six months.
4. The suit must be brought within five years from the date the
tax was paid or within two years after the claim was re
jected.

Numerous decisions have been made involving these conditions,
the most important of which are to the effect that the claim which
forms the basis for the suit must be a proper claim for refund or
credit. A claim for abatement or an informal claim is not suffi
cient. Likewise, the claim must have been based upon the same
grounds which form the basis of the suit. A suit upon one ground
may not be founded upon a claim for refund stating entirely
different grounds.
These steps should be taken during the pendency of the motion
before the department with the definite thought in mind that a
proper foundation shall be laid for future court action. Other
wise, due to the statute of limitations, it may be too late to lay
the proper foundation after the department has made its rejection.
In this respect the negotiations before the department are similar
to a trial in the lower court. The foundation for the appeal must
be laid during the trial. It is too late when the trial court has
entered its judgment.
The preliminary conditions having been fulfilled, it is necessary
to consider the nature of the suit to be brought and the court in
which it should be brought. There are two branches of the
judiciary in which the suit may be filed. The action may be
brought in a federal district court, of which there are now over
eighty sitting in the various federal judicial districts of the United
States. On the other hand, suit may be filed in the United States
court of claims at Washington. We will consider the classes of
actions to be brought in each of these courts.
As stated above, a sovereign state may not be sued without its
consent. At common law, however, the judges found a mode
for avoiding the stringency of this rule in cases where taxes had
been illegally collected. They permitted suits, sounding in
188
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assumpsit, to be brought against the collector to whom the taxes
were paid, provided the taxpayer had paid the taxes under duress
or protest and had thus put the collector on notice that the taxes
were considered illegal and that suit for their recovery would be
instituted. In the absence of such a protest there was no way
at common law for recovering taxes which had been illegally paid.
This common-law right to sue the collector was adopted by the
federal courts of this country and is recognized today. However,
section 1116 of the revenue act of 1926 has relieved taxpayers of
the necessity of paying the taxes under protest. The suit against
the collector may be brought in any amount and must be filed
in the district in which the defendant, the collector, is a resident
at the time the suit is filed.
The rigor of the common-law inhibition against suits against
the sovereign was relaxed by the enactment, in 1887, of the Tucker
act, which made it possible to sue the United States directly for
“claims not exceeding $10,000 founded upon the constitution of
the United States or any law of congress, or upon any regulation
of an executive department.” Suits for the recovery of taxes
illegally collected have been held to be included within this defini
tion. Further, the revenue act of 1921 amended the Tucker act
to allow suits for taxes to be brought against the United States
“even though the claim exceeds $10,000, if the collector by whom
such tax, penalty, or sum was collected, is dead or not in office
at the time the suit or proceeding is commenced.” This obviates
the necessity of proceeding against collectors long since gone
from office, or against the personal representatives of deceased
collectors. Where the United States is named as defendant, the
Tucker act requires that the petition must be filed in the district
in which the plaintiff resides.
In all such cases in the federal courts the rules of practice and
procedure are the same as in other civil suits. The “Rules of
decisions” act of 1789 has been held to require the district courts
to follow the rules of evidence enforced by the state courts of the
state in which the district court sits. The conformity act of 1872
requires that the practice, pleadings and form and mode of
proceeding in the federal courts shall conform to like practice in
the state courts. These statutes apply to suits to recover taxes.
Summarizing, we find that in the district courts the practice in
tax suits is largely the same as in any other civil suit. If the
amount sued for is less than $10,000 the action for recovery
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may be brought either against the collector or against the United
States. If, however, the taxes total more than that amount,
the action must be brought against the collector to whom the
taxes were paid, unless he is dead or out of office, and in that event
the United States may be named as defendant. Only one class
of suit is permitted; the taxpayer may not join both the collector
and the United States as defendants.
Suits in the court of claims will be found more acceptable in
many respects. The action there may be brought in any sum and
regardless of the status of the collector to whom the taxes were
paid. In that court the United States is always named as de
fendant. Another important advantage is that the docket of
the court is not so crowded as in many of the district courts.
More important, however, is the manner of taking testimony and
conducting the hearing.
The taking of oral testimony before the court of claims at a
formal hearing is a rare occurrence. Under statutory authority
there have been appointed a number of commissioners of the
court whose duty it is, under the law and the rules of the court,
to take testimony and making findings of fact. Virtually all of
the testimony in cases pending before the court is taken under
the jurisdiction of these commissioners. The rules provide that
where convenient the testimony shall be taken in the county
in which the witness resides. The rules likewise provide for the
taking of testimony on deposition before a notary public or other
officer authorized to certify to such testimony. When the petition
is filed with the court and answer made by the government (usually
a general traverse, or denial) the case is assigned to one of the
commissioners for a report of the facts. Arrangements can then
be made with the commissioner to produce the witnesses before
him or to take depositions before a duly authorized officer of the
locality in which the witnesses reside. In some instances the
testimony is taken both by deposition and orally before the
commissioner. At the conclusion of the testimony the parties
will be permitted to file with the commissioner suggested findings
of fact based upon the testimony adduced. The commissioner
then makes his report to the court and the parties are allowed
thirty days within which to object to his findings. These objec
tions will be passed upon by the court. Briefs are then filed by
the parties and in due course the case is set down for oral argument
before the court itself. Thus, in the usual case, the only actual
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appearance before the judges of the court is to make oral argument
on the basis of findings of fact as reported by the commissioner
and the printed briefs already filed.
It will readily be seen that the procedure before the court of
claims is likely to be more convenient and expeditious in tax
cases. It is certain that the procedure there is no more difficult
and the rules of pleading and evidence no more stringent than
those which are enforced by the board of tax appeals, and there
should be no more hesitancy, in a proper case, in seeking the
relief which this court affords than there now is in petitioning the
board of tax appeals for a redetermination of a deficiency.
In all probability, if a case has justified the expense and in
convenience of a long and vexatious litigation before the treasury
department, court action is likewise justified. At all events, it is
certainly the duty of the representative of the taxpayer, when he
believes that an erroneous decision has been rendered by the
department, to apprise his client of the further possible relief by
an appeal to the courts and to place before him the full facts of
the matter so as to enable him independently to reach a decision
whether or not to proceed with the case.
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